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IN THE

~

Supreme Court
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
.JA~IES

D. LAWS,

INDUST~~AL CO~fMISSION

Plaintiff,

OF
UTAH, and GENEVA STEEL COMPAXY, a corporation,
Defendants.

l
I

Case No.
7253

j

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In addition to the facts contained in the statement in
plaintiff's brief, we wish to direct the court's aHention
to the following faets which we believe will aid the court
in the determination of this contro~ersy.
Plaintiff was first employed at Geneva on July 26,
1946, the very day of his injury. Compensation was :paid
for one week and wages paid for August 5, 6, 7, 12 and 13,
1946; on August 14, 1946 he was, on his request, further
hospitalized and on September 3, 1946, again on his request, re'leased. ( R. 125) After an examination by the
1
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).fedical Staff of Geneva he was hospitalized in October,
1946 and the operation performed by Dr. Lindem. Release followed on November 8, 1946, in turn followed by
further hospitalization and release on December 22, 1946.
Geneva paid for all such medical care and hospitalization
and compensation up to that time. (R. 92)
On May 23, 1947 the Medical Advisory Board made
its recommendalfions (R. 32):
In estimating this disability we take into
account that this :possibly may have existed prior
to his injury, but believe that he did have some
injury, and also feel that there are certain pathologic changes in the spine, and also there is the.
appearance of a psychoneurosis of long standing.
His disability is mainly subjective. We would
estimate the permanent partial disability at not
over 15% loss of bodily function.''
And on June 2, 1947, the Commission notified plaintiff and Geneva (R. 33) :
''After carefully considering the recommendations of the ].fedical Advisory Board, and all
matters pertaining to your case, it has been determined that you have suffered a permanent disability amounting to 15% loss of bodily function."
Such was the award made on December 24, 1947,
after full hearing before the Commission.
Without consulting the Commission or Geneva p1aintiff on January 19, 1948 underwent a further and different operation, a spinal fusion "to correct the defect
that had existed prior" to the injury of July 26, 1946.
(R. 183-4.)
2
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Plaintiff in1med.iately filed his first petition for rehearing he fore the Con1mission, alleging:
··The hosuital reeord.s and. rnedical diseoYeries n1ade dnri~g the t)peration (of Jnn. 1D, 1~)-±8)
\Yill prove to the comn1ission conclusively that
. the applicant suffered a more seriou~ injur)· than
was the opinion of the Drs. testifying at the hearing and that the applicant has not been adequately-compensated for his injuries." (Tr. :16-7.)
. pehhon
. . f or re h eanng
.
Tlns
was gran t ed on.Tj\'{ri;; 29 ,
· 1948. On the rehearing it was stipulated that the ·testimony and evidence submitted in the hearings of October
22, 1947 and December 9, 1947 would be accepted on the
rehearing. (R. 169.)

After hearing, the Commission on July 12, 1948 made
its decision :
''The question is whether the applicant was
fully compensated by the defendants for the injury received on July 26, 1946. ''
and made the following Findings:
''After hearing the testimony in the case and
reviewing the same as set forth in the transcript
and other documentary evidence received and
made a part of the record, the Commission finds
that there has been no change in the physical condition of the applicant since the award made on
December 24, 1947 and therefore conclude that the
award made to the applicant on December 24, 1947
was considered adequate to cover the temporary
total disability suffered by the applicant as a result of his injuries received on July 26, 1946 as
weU as the permanent partial disability which
the applicant had on December 24, 1947 as a re3
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1

I
sult of such injuries.
''The Commission further concludes that the
applicant has been adequately compensated for
his injuries received on July 26, 1946. ''
We do not admit, of course, the statements made in
the brief to the effect that the Plaintiff in fact totally
disabled; nor do we admit that the wndisputed evidence
was to that effect.
I.

The refusal of the Industria'! Commission to render
a decision on the rehearing modifying its previous decision of December 24, 1947 on the grounds that the applicant had shown no change in his physical condition
since the date of the original decision of December 24,
1947 was contra to law and was error.
In this statement of error it is apparent that plaintiff misconceives the import and intent of the decision of
July 12, 1948. On the rehearing held June 9, 1948 the
entire record made on the previous hearings was ac.:
cepted as part of the record. The Commission did not
confine itself to the evidence received on the rehearing,
but as stated by H, considered all the evidence, including all three hearings. Counsel frankly concedes that
applicant failed to show any change in his physica'l condition-couns·el had no alternative-applicant and his
own witness testified that there had been no change.
The Commission in fact, as it was bound to do, considered the matter entirely open-a trial de novo-and
upon all the evidence made its decision. Upon granting
a rehearing the Commission
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• • "' -= -= 1nay adopt the prior findings made, if
in its judginent they snfficientl~· reflect all of the
1naterial fact~ a~ disclosed h~· the evidence, and
n1ake a new order or render a new judgment accordingly, "·hether it be the same or different .effect than was the first or displaced order or judgInent. ''
Carter v. Industrial Co1nn1ission, 76 U. 520,
290 P. 776.

The decision of July 12, 1948 quoted above was merely an adoption of the findings of the previous award.
The Commission again reviewed all the ,evidence and
the award of December 24, 1947, which was adequate
when made, was still adequate and reaffirmed. The evidence presented at the rehearing revealed nothing new
to the Commission of substance. That later evidence
was merely cumu'lative and, in the proper exercise of
its fact-finding power, the Commission could see no
reason for making different findings. The plaintiff presented nothing to persuade the Commission that the facts
were anything other than originally found. Plaintiff's
argument should be addressed to the Commission, not
to this court. His further evidence did not tip the halanee of the weight of the evidence in his favor.
"\Ve call the court's attention to ~the last paragraph of
the award:
''The Commission further concludes that the
applicant has been adequately compensated for
his injuries received on July 26, 1946." (Italics
ours.)
It may be conceded that when a rehearing is granted
the Commission may correct any errors it may have
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l
committed in the original decision. But that is not to
say that it must render a different decision. The plaintif was given an opportunity to persuade the Commission that the first award was inadequate, but he failed to
do so. On disputed testimony the Commission was of the
same opinion still. Dr. Okelberry testified on the first
hearing (October 22, 1947) that a spinal fusion was in
his opinion necessary. (R. 97) The Commission did not
agree. Such operation was performed January 19, 1948
and on June 9, 1948 the same doctor testified that p~ain
tiff would not have gotten well without the operation.
( R. 178) The Commission again did not agree.
We do not understand that plaintiff claims there is
any lack of evidence to support the findings of the Commission. He has brought this case here contending that
the award must be set aside because based on an erroneous ground. But that is not sufficient even were it
true; he must show that the decision itself is erroneous.
The reasons or grounds given for its decision are no
essential part of the decision: .

* * * and it is universally recogniz·ed that a
correct decision will not be disturbed even though
it is based on improper grounds. 3 Am. Jur. p.
367, § 825; Buringham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 24'5
Pac. 977.
Where the finding of the Commission is correct, error in its reason, if any, will not prevent
affirmanee of the award. 71 C.J., p. 127:5, § 1251.
II.

Errors Numbers Two, Three and Four as sta·ted by
plain tiff on page 7 of this brief are :
6
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Error Number Two

The C01nmission conunitted error in not
awarding the applicant further compensation
fro1n the 26th day of December 1946 to the date
of the rehearing.
Error Number Three

The Connnission committed error in not
awarding the appellant the medical and hospital
expenses incurred incidental to the operation of
January 19, 1947 (1948~)
Error Number Four

The Commission committed error in not continuing the payn1ent of compensation to the appellant from the date of rehearing until such time
as the Commission should determine in fur~ther
proceedings the exact date the appellant's condition became fixed and at that time awarding to
the appellant such compensation for his partial
permanent loss of bodily function as he was then
entitled.
·
Plaintiff's (applicant-appellant) position is:
1. That he should be awarded compensation as for
temporary total disability up to the time of the rehearing (Error Number Two); and from the date of the rehearing ''until such time as the Commission should determine in further proceedings the exact date the ape~
lant's condition became fixed (Error Number Four).

2. That upon his condition becoming fixed an award
as for permanent partial disability should be made. (Error Number Four.)
3.

That he should be awarded medical and hospital

-.
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lI
expenses incidental to the operation of January 19, 1948.
(Error Number Three.)
Since plaintiff's entire argument is based upon the
false premise that he was in fact totally disabled at the
time of the rehearing, we thought it proper to discuss
these propositions together.
1. The Commission in making its decision of July
12, 1948 did not limit its consideration to the "·evidence
presented on the rehearing.'' That order itself recites
''After hearing the testimony in the case and reviewing
the same as set forth in the transcript and other documentary evidence received and made a part of the record, the Commission finds * * *.'' This is an express
sta:tement that the Commission considered all the evidence, not mere'ly that offered on the rehearing. This
court will of course take that statement at its face .value.
Furthermore, plaintiff expressly stipulated (Tr. 169):
Com. Egan: :May it be stipulated that the
testimony· and evidence submitted in those (prior)
hearings may he accepted in this hearing'
).fr. Gibson:

It may.

:Mr. H-eald:

Yes.

2. The Commission in its previous award found
that plaintiff ''suffered certain disabilities and therefore concludes that he is entitled to the benefits under
the Compensation Act, i.e., payment for temporary total
disability from the 26th day of July 1946 to the 22nd
day of December 1946 * * * '' and for partial permanent
8
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un the basis of 15% loss of bodily function and the award
was n1ade accordingly. Such award was made upon conflicting evidence; is supported by substantia'! eompetent
evidence and would not be disturbed by this court. The
award of July 1:2, 19-!8 based on all the evidence concluded that the award of December 24, 1947 afforded
plaintiff adequate compensation for temporary total disability (as well as for permanent partial) and thereby
adopted the findings and conclusions of the earlier
award. It rnay not be successfully contended that the
Commission was bound to reach a different conclusion
-the aet of the Commission in granting a rehearing did
not guarantee a greater award than that already made.
The Commission granted a rehearing to afford p1aintiff an opportunity to present further evidence in an
attempt to persuade the Commission that it was in error.
The plaintiff did not sustain the burden and the Commission was of the same opinion still.
Carter v. Industrial Commission, supra, 76
Utah 520, 290 Pac. 776.
3. The award as made on December 24, 1947 and
as reaffirmed July 12, 1948 was bas·ed on substantial,
competent although disputed, evidence and should not
be disturbed by this court.
"It appears to be the contention of the
plaintiff. that this court will review the record to
determine wherein lies the preponderance of the
evidence and affirm or set aside the denial of
award or judgment of the Commission accordingly. But this we are not ca1led upon, nor are
we a~t liberty to do. * * * We are called on, in
this case, Inerely to determine whether there is
9
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anv substantial evidence to support that decision.
vVilson v. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 524,
108 Pac. (2) 519.
In the ordinary case it is not incumbent upon defendant to show the evidence that supports the award
made by the Commission; but rather the plaintiff must
show wher,ein the evidence does not support the award as
made. However, since plaintiff in the case a;t bar states
n1any times that the uncontradicted evidence is that
plaintiff was in fact totally disabled, we ask the court's
indulgence while we refer to some of ~the evidence which
counsel would have this court and the Commission ignore.
A. As to temporary tota1 disability-(the injury
to the coccyx had been taken care of prior to the first
hearing. R. 97)
Dr. Hatch, R. 117:

****
Q.

Did you find in this man any injury to the
disc between the vertebra~

A.

I didn',t find any that I could make out.

I told him if I had a back like this and had
infection in the throat and tonsils and prostate
and sinuses that I would have them taken care of,
and that he would be much better.
Dr. Lindem (R. 125-6)
A. After preliminary examination which occurred over a period of days, and taking a blood
count and urinalysis, b1ood pressure and temperatures. I myself reached the conclusion that it was
a controversial matter as to whether Mr. Laws
10
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had a fractured roeeyx. The presence of tlw spondylolisthesi~ and also the osteoarthriti~ and the
presenee of p~·orrhea was noted. It. was no't in
a great degree and probably because of recomE1endations, whieh were not entirely in agreement
a.n10ng- the orthopedic Inen, Dr. Pemberton and
Huether. It wa~ discussed with Dr. Wright and
the hospital staff. 'y e concluded that inasmuch
a~ :JJ r. Laws emnplained of pain in his coccyx at
the time. It had been demonstrated in our findings that the emnplaints "'ere entirely inconsistent. but they finally seen1ed to concentrate on
the coccyx region. I did not agree that this had
been fractured. However, Dr. Okelberry said
it was fractured and Dr. Huether though it n1ight
be fractured. I proceeded to operate the coccyx.
He was making complaint out of proportion to a
fractured cocc~'X. However, we removed it and
he made recovery. I sent him to a Masseur, and
31r. Laws would not permit the masseur to do
any massaging. The masseur complained that he
would not let him proceed with the massage and
ph~'siotherapy that we recommended, so we
stopped that manner of treatment. Then when
he had him up and around he began to complain
in different regions of the body. We found he
was lying in bed in the morning until the doctor
made the rounds, and then he would be n1ost
agile. After a period extending to the 8th of
October, a period of nearly a month, we felt that
with the observation and examination that we had
carried on with ~Ir. Laws, that he was physically
able as he was at the time of his pre-employment
physical examination, and that he shou1d be required to go back to work, and we so recommended
and discharg·ed him from the hospital. In my
absence from the city at the time Mr. Laws quit
work last December and came to m~v office, my
associate, not knowing what to do, sent him to the
11
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hospital again. V1 e came to the same con~lu
sion, that whatever disability he had a_t the time
of the injury we had relieved and no resi?-ual from
those injuries, and had put him back In a state
that was comparable to his pre-employment examination. We felt he had no residual. We employed orthopedic men and had the Hosp~tal Staff
and my own associates at the office and on recommendation of the Industrial Commission he was
brought up for a J\![edical Board hearing. We had
Dr. Wright perform a comp1ete neurological examination, which was done, and his report is in
the record. I have not examined :1\tir. Laws since.
I-Ie was discharged from St. Mark's Hospital in
December. Except for observation in the room, I
don't know anything about him.
The Medical Advisory Board's
May 23, 1947 (R. 32) :

~ecommendations

of

''In estimating this disability we take into
account that this possibly may have existed prior
to his injury but believe that he did have some
injury, and also feel that there are certain pathologic changes in the spine and also there is the
appearance of a psychoneurosis of long standing.
His disability is mainly subjective. We would
estimate the permanent partial disability at not
over 15% loss of hodi~y function.''
And Dr. Stewart A. Wright, who, at the request of
the Commission examined plaintiff March 27, 1947, (Tr.
R. 2'6-8):
"It s·eems to me that this patient greatly
exaggerates and even invents complaints and I
do not ·believe there is any indication for surgery
at this time. I would suggest that a settlem·ent
be worked out if possible, at a disability not to
.exceed 5% would be reasonable.''

12
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Plaintiff seen1s to be of the opinion that only tlwt eYidence offered at the rehearing is to be considered.
B. As to permanent partial-the evidence recited
above ah~o supports the Cmnmission 's finding that an
award based on a 15~~ loss of bodily function was adequate compensation. Such award was not only supported
by substantial evidence, but gave the plaintiff the absolute maxi1num.
C.

~-\.s

to medical and hospital expenses :

At the original hearing Dr. Okelberry stated it as
his opinion that the spinal fusion operation was necessary. He performed that operation and after doing so
was of the opinion that it had been necessary. Dr. Lindenl and Dr. Wright disagreed and the Commission, accepting what to it was the more credib~·e testimony, found
that such operation was not necessary. It is not enough
for plaintiff to show that the operation was necessary
to cure a congenital defect; he must show that it was
made necessary by the accidental injury. And therein
plaintiff has failed.
Plaintiff concedes that the operation of January 19,
1948 was performed without the consent, written or oral,
of the Commission. The l\Iedical and Surgical Fee
Schedule issued by the Industrial Commission of Utah,
effective September 1, 1947, provides in part:
11.

Necessary Attention.

No patient will be permitted to change from
one hospital to another, or from one doctor to another without first fully explaining in writing his

13
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reasons for desiring such change and securing the
written consent of the Commission. When unauthorized charges are made the patient must pay
for such change.
When, on January 19, 1948 the spinal fusion was performed, the order or award of December 24, 1947, while
not yet a final award (in the sense that time for review
had elapsed), had not been vacated or set aside. It was
a valid order until vacated or set aside. That award was
a finding that the spina1 fusion was wot necessary; yet
plaintiff changed from Dr. Lindem to Dr. Okelberry,
from St. Mark's Hospital to the L.D.S. Hospital; all
without any cons·ent of the Commission, and this in face
of the Commission's view that the operation was not
necessary. After the operation was performed the Commission reaffirmed its position. The findings being such,
and no consent having been obtained, we may well ask
on what theory can Geneva he required to pay for the
operation~ Section 42-1-75 does not require an employer
to pay for such medical and hospital services as the
patient may desire or even what he feels to be necessary, hut only such ''as may be necessary.''

IV
If it be said that the award of the Commission does
not contain sufficient or proper findings to sustain the
award, we refer the court to the following rules which
are well esta!b~ished in this jurisdiction:
l. The Commission is not required to make any
written findings.

Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co. v.
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Industrial Com1nission, 66 Utah -!-!H,
800.

2-!:~

Pac.

·) If no findings are 1nade this Court ean supply
the1n aU.
Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission,
103 Utah 381, 137 P. (2) 364.
3. In the absence of findings this court will presume that had they been 1nade ,they would
have been such as to support the decision; it
cannot be assumed the Commission would have
entered a decision contrary to what they believe the facts to justify.
:Jioray v. Ind. Com., 58 Utah 404, 199 P.
1023: Jones Y. Ind. Com., 90 Utah 121, 61 P.
2d 10; American Smelting & Refining Co v.
Ind. Con1., 79 Utah 302, 10 P. 2d 918.
The record herein will sustain findings to the effect
that:
(1) Temporary total disability extended from July
26, 1946 to December 22, 1946.
(2)
1946.

Temporary total disability ended·December 22,

(3)
1946.

Physical condition became fixed December 22,

(4) Permanent partial disability suffered was a
15% loss of bodily function.
(5) No surgery or medical or hospital services
were necessary after December 22, 1946 and the operation performed January 19, 1948 by Dr. Okelberry was
not authorized by the Commission and was not necessary
15
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.....

to treat the patient for any condition caused by the injury of July 26, 1946 or for any aggravation of a preexisting condition due to the said injury.
Which findings we must assume the Commission
wou'ld have made had it made findings. It's award was
based upon the assumption that such were the facts.
CONCLUSION

In its award of July 12, 1948 made after the rehearing the Commission adopted and reaffirmed the previous award of December 24, 1947. The award, being
based upon substantial, competent evidence, should not
be upset by this court.
Respectfully su'bmitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON
Attorney General
ALLEN B. SORENSEN
Assist,ant Attorney General

For the

Indus't!r~al

Commissio:n

C. C. PARSON'S.
WM. M. 1\fcCREA
A.D. MOFFAT
CALVIN A. BEHLE
Attorneys for
Geneva Steel Oompa;n;y.
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